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LENDING BOOMS, UNDERWRITING AND COMPETITION:
THE BARING CRISIS REVISITED
Abstract
This paper aims to provide new light on a famous episode in financial history, the so called
Baring crisis. Taking a microeconomic approach, this paper addresses issues that were not
emphasized in traditional explanations of the crisis. We analyze borrowing costs in the
1880s using new data from debt contracts. We argue that, despite a worsening
macroeconomic situation in Argentina, its Government continued to have capital market
access besides decreasing borrowing costs. This paper suggests that competition between
financial intermediaries was a main cause behind the crisis.
INTRODUCTION
This paper aims to provide new light on one of the most famous events in financial history.
During the 1880s, Latin American countries experienced a foreign investment boom. A
major part of these flows took the form of sovereign debt, and the bonds were traded in the
main European financial centers. In 1890, as a result of a mix of a liberal monetary policy
and macroeconomic imbalances, Argentina suspended debt service causing the “Baring”
crisis, as the house of Baring had to call for financial support1. Historians and economists
have long discussed the causes of the Argentinean default. More recently, a different
literature has debated whether the crisis triggered contagion2. The fact is that after the crisis
1 Baring was Argentina’s main underwriter since the independence of the country. The failure of several bond
issues and Baring own overexposition of Argentina’s bonds caused its later collapse. On a detailed description
of the Baring crisis see Marichal, A century of debt crises, Clapham, The Bank of England: A history, or Della
Paolera, Straining with the Anchor.
2 Triner, “International Capital and the Brazilian Encilhamento, 1889-1892 : An Early Example of Contagion
among Emerging Markets?” ; Mauro, Sussman and Yafeh. “Emerging Market Spreads : Then Versus Now”.
2there was a sudden standstill in capital exports from the main financial centers to the rest of
the world. In this paper, we suggest that the reason for excessive lending before the crisis
and the stop in capital exports are truly the two sides of the same coin.
Unlike the traditional literature, we use microeconomic insights to identify a puzzle:
Argentina’s borrowing costs decreased during the 1880s despite a worsening
macroeconomic situation. Empirical evidence comes from debt contracts, which have never
been used for this kind of analysis. This new data is a rich source and suggests that
conventional explanations are insufficient.
This paper is divided into five sections. First, we review the literature on the 1890 crisis and
show that they cannot account for the continued lending. We then describe the debt issue
mechanism for foreign Governments at the end of the 19th century. In the third section we
present a simple model of risk sharing between banks and Governments comparing both
monopoly and competition between financial intermediaries. Fourth, we analyze
Argentina’s Governments borrowing from 1880-1889. Evidence shows that banks
displayed an unusual risk taking behavior despite deteriorating fundamentals in Argentina.
In the fifth section we present several arguments that suggest that increasing competition
between financial intermediaries was a key factor behind the crisis.
THE BARING CRISIS: EXISTING THEORIES
A brief overview of more than 100 years of economic analysis on the Baring crisis may
sound too ambitions. However, we may say that this financial episode has traditionally
been looked at from a macroeconomic point of view. Conventional explanations expose
3problems mainly within the demand side (mainly Argentina’s economic policies). The only
existing supply side theory, explaining problems with the lender is Kindleberger’s theory of
speculative manias.
Williams (1920) is the pioneering study. His reasoning supposes that the Baring crisis was
due to increasing commercial deficits in Argentina during the 1880s. As foreign capital
flows were necessary to minimize exchange rate depreciation, the freezing of these flows
translated in exchange rate depreciation and thus an external crisis (foreign debt was
denominated in foreign currency).
Prebisch (1919) similarly analyses the cyclical aspects of external factors (capital flows and
exports) and its repercussions on the Argentinean economy. Using the same data as
Williams, the Baring crisis was preceded by an expansive phase in the world economy, also
fed by a rise in demand for external loans by the Government. This situation resulted in
credit expansion, consumption increase, excessive confidence and a general feeling of
prosperity that translated into financial and property speculation. When the Bank of
England raised its interest rates in the late 1880s, capital flows stopped and caused the
precipitation of Argentina in the deepest phase of the crisis.
Adopting a similar view, Ford (1962) suggests that imbalances in the external sector were
responsible for the convertibility failure in the 1880s, due to the different phases in capital
flows: indebtedness was followed by an increase in imports and currency depreciation. As
for Prebisch, as these flows stopped, debt service had to still be paid in gold. This phase
deteriorated because during the period, investment returns did not sufficiently compensate
4for the increase in imports and debt payments. In 1890, Argentina was particularly affected
by this fact, which was reinforced by the macroeconomic politics of the 1880s that
encouraged credit expansion although investment returns in the export sector were not yet
adequate to cover external payments.
An alternative view is presented in the work of Cortes Conde (1989). Following a
monetarist analysis, Cortes Conde writes that the Baring crisis had its root in Argentina’s
monetary policies. As a response to credit increases and money supply, public purchased
gold anticipating currency devaluation, causing reserve outflows and money depreciation,
which translated in difficulties to meet the debt service of the country.
Della Paolera (1995, 2001) expands this view to encompass the fiscal side. He argues that
the Baring crisis was caused by inconsistent monetary and fiscal policies in Argentina
during the 1880s, seeking, on the one side, to return to currency convertibility but running
persistent fiscal deficits on the other. Even though there existed a slight improvement by
1886, fiscal matters became fragile from 1888, affecting public’s perception of inflation,
thereby causing people to fly from paper currency into specie inciting currency
depreciation. The process was reinforced by further money creation to finance deficits and
the impossibility to obtain access to capital markets.
On the supply side, Kindleberger (1996) questions investors’ rationality, and suggests that
the Baring crisis was a typical investment bubble. Low rates in British investments and a
sudden favorable perspective in Argentina caused the displacement necessary for a boom in
Argentinean financial assets. He argues that the Baring crisis followed a typical euphoria-
5distress path during the 1880s. However, Kindleberger identifies the downturn of the
euphoria for Argentinean bonds in 1888 (two years before the outbreak of the crisis) when
German investors sold their bonds to their British counterpart, even though the behavior of
this second kind of investors continued in the opposite direction, attracting Kindleberger’s
attention as one of the few historical cases where “enthusiasm of one class of investor for a
security failed to communicate itself long to another”3. The crisis precipitated when the true
situation of Argentina was publicly known, namely, by the adverse events of 1890 such like
a technical default in March or the political riots in Buenos Aires in July.
For us, fiscal and monetary policies were full of flaws and investors’ sustained purchases
not well advised. Taking into account key features of the 19th century international financial
architecture we introduce new elements which lead to the crisis, as traditional explanations
leave a number of important questions opened. Most important address the forecast of the
crisis. The deteriorating financial situation of the country in general and of the fiscal
position of the Government in particular, did not deter investors to channel new and
increasing funds to Argentina. We can only wonder on how Argentina managed to continue
having capital market access even some months before the outbreak of the crisis4.
Contemporary economists as well as later works of economic historians adhere to this view.
For instance, Wirth (1893) pointed out that “In 1886, European investors already began to
suspect that the Argentine credit was being overworked”5. Eichengreen (1999) argues that
there existed fears for the stability of Argentine finances as early as 1886. Joslin (1963) also
3 Kindleberger, Keynesianism vs monetarism, and other essays in financial history .
4 From a public finance point of view, Terry (1893) already signaled that Argentina’s troubles began in 1885,
with the suspension of the system of gold exchange standard. Duncan (1983) also pointed out that the
financial policy of Argentina’s Government in the late 1880s could only lead to bankrupt.
5 Wirth, “The Crisis of 1890”.
6suggests that investors could expect the crisis in early 1888, and Della Paolera and Taylor
remark that the first “technical default” of Argentina was in 1889, more than one year
before the crisis6.
In fact, reports and publications of the time lead us to support this generalized consensus.
Credit Lyonnais, a French deposit bank which became after 1890 a leading voice in
European financial markets, advised against investing in Argentina7 since 1887. Mulhall, a
recognized statistician on economic matters in South America, suggested prudence about
the immediate economic future of the country8. Financial press in Europe was increasingly
hostile to Argentina, referring openly to the financial situation of the country as a “crisis”
since9 1887. Finally, the publication “Fenn on the Funds” classified Argentina as a problem
country in 1889 by calculating an “early warning” debt crisis indicator which took into
account its debt service and its exports level10.
Interestingly, markets’ behavior did not reflect these views. Spreads of Argentinean public
bonds on UK consoles remained stable during the late 1880s. Moreover, bonds on behalf of
Argentina’s federal, provincial, and municipal Governments continued to be issued in
European financial markets. Although speculation may have been persistent during the last
years before the crisis, it is unlikely that it explains the whole story. Besides, a pure
macroeconomic view remains also inadequate to understand what lead to the crisis, as some
macroeconomic variables considerably deteriorated in the last years. The answer, as it
6Della Paolera and Taylor, Straining with the anchor, p. 19 .
7 Crédit Lyonnais Archives, DEEF 73405.
8 Some of Mulhall’s estimations on wealth and debt in the country were published in the Buenos Aires
Standard, 26 th February 1890.
9 For instance, the Buenos Aires Standard on 22nd October 1887, or the Statist, 6th October 1888.
10 On a detailed explanation of this index see Flandreau and Zumer (2003).
7seems to us, may come from a microeconomic perspective, a fact that historians have long
recognized. Understanding 19 th century finance and capital flows requires precisely this
kind of analysis, as suggested for instance by Marichal (1984):
“We should note, however, that virtually all discussions that have been undertaken by
economists [working on capital flows and exports to Argentina] are situated in a general –
macro- context, without careful analysis on the details or characteristics of individual
transactions –on a micro level- nor the specific strategies of the group of banks that
directed the financial operations” 11
TOWARD A MICROECONOMIC APPROACH: 19TH CENTURY CAPITAL MARKETS
FOR SOVEREIGN PUBLIC OFFERINGS
This paper tries to fill the vacuum in the literature on the Baring crisis taking into account
the industrial organization of international capital markets. In this section we will begin to
answer the open questions named above by describing a specific channel that we consider
vital in explaining the crisis. This channel is the sovereign debt issue mechanism12. The
sources consulted for this section are both primary and secondary. We used classic works
mainly concerned with London and Paris bond issues, although we include some German
works. We also consulted the archives from banks in London and Paris. Our main sources
were debt contracts, which we describe below, although we complemented the providing
information and data with the surrounding correspondence.
11 Marichal, “Los Banqueros Europeos y los empréstitos Argentinos: Rivalidad y Colaboración, 1880-1890”,
p.75.
12 Today also called “Sovereign Initial Public Offerings (IPOs)”.
8To begin with the secondary literature, we have on the one hand the classic works of Jenks
(1927), Finnie (1934), Cairncross (1953) or more recently, Suzuki (1994). Nonetheless,
these works ignore an important amount of literature describing debt issues in other
countries, such as France or Germany, which developed parallel bond issue mechanisms
not practiced in London13. In 19th century, European financial markets were very much
integrated in many aspects, particularly in sovereign debt bond issues. We would not have
the complete picture if we were only to analyze one market, for competition and solidarity
interacted between and within these markets. We will focus on the main differences
between financial places and on the role of the debt contracts in the whole mechanism.
Bond issues in the financial markets of late 19th century can be regarded as a four-stage
process, although precise stages varied according to the countries, intermediaries involved,
and markets. These stages are: 1) the search for an intermediary; 2) choice of issue system;
3) the planning of the issue; and 4) Market placement. The decision on how the bonds were
to be issued was taken in the first two stages, and the terms were formalized in a document
called the debt contract, signed between the financial intermediary and the Government.
We will now explain each stage in more detail.
13 It has been a general practice that these authors use almost the same primary sources. A first and basic
reference is an article in The Banker’s Magazine of July 1876, which describes the evolution of bonds’ issues
mechanism between the years 1860-1870 (although other press articles are sometimes cited, particularly in
Suzuki’s work). A second reference are the writings of O’Hagan, an active stock broker in foreign loans and
an important supporter of banks’ syndicalisation in order to diminish the risks from bonds’ issues. A third
and very recurrent reference is the work of Drummond-Wolf, H. Rambling Collections, vol. II. Finally, Jenks
primarily uses the “Reports from the Select Committee on Loans to foreign states”. While there exists a
relative historical consensus in the description of the debt issue mechanism, economic formal analysis still
remains at the very beginning. In this work we try to formalize some basic ideas to consider for future
research.
91) The search for an intermediary. External borrowing through international financial
markets required Governments to look for an intermediary14. In some cases, parliaments
voted laws allowing the Government to look for funds for particular projects. An agent was
named to negotiate in Europe a loan with financial intermediaries (mainly merchant banks).
Banks could also take the initiative and propose their services to potential borrowers: for
instance financial institutions, having to do with foreign business operated through agents
of their own or commercial houses established in the country itself, which had developed
closed relationships with local officials15.
A better understanding of this phase would imply a word about the structure of European
Financial Markets. In London, the market for bond issues was dominated by a few
merchant banks established several decades before the 1880s. Jenks observed that, from
1866, the most prominent banking houses in London were of foreign origin, like
Frühling&Goschen or J.S. Morgan; others had branches in London, like the American
house Morton & Rose; finally, some of them also operated in some of the main cities on the
Continent, this being the case for houses like Rothschild and Stern and other less reputed
like Bischoffsheim or Erlangers.
In Paris, foreign Government bond issues were mainly a business of the banques d’affaires
(the French equivalent of the British merchant banks), although certain important banques
de depots (commercial banks) could also participate in some stages of the bond issue. For
14 Nowadays called “Lead Managers”
15 In a rather surprising manner, this second case has been overlooked in the secondary literature, although it
was a general rule for some Latin American countries in the 1880s, and particularly for Argentina, at a time
when bank competition to get issues was at peak.
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the period 1860-1890, French banking experienced an important expansionary phase
(including business with Latin America, see Regalsky (2002)). Bouvier writes that Crédit
Lyonnais increased ten times its nominal capital between 1863 and 1881 (from 20 to 200
millions francs)16 and expanded its activities towards foreign business. In particular, Crédit
Lyonnais followed the path classified as “extraordinary operations”17 which remained
mainly within the hands of some big merchant banks or credit institutions, represented for
instance by Société Générale or Paribas.
2) The Choice of issue system. Each bank could differentiate its services offering specific
bonds’ issue systems, so that choosing a bank and setting a mechanism were jointly
decided. The first step to be taken was about the most appropriate issue system, for which
several possibilities existed. The simplest way was to use the system which the French
called “vente a commission”(sale on commission). Banks acted merely as distributors,
receiving subscriptions from investors for the purchase of bonds, and more generally doing
every necessary administrative step for the floating of the loan. For each service, banks
received a commission as a percentage of each bond handled18. If a bond issue failed, banks
held no responsibility. The Governments of rich countries of Western Europe often charged
the domestic banks with this possibility. However, Governments could have preference for
cash, and receiving it with full certainty involved the formation of bank syndicates19. These
16 Bouvier, Histoire Economique et Histoire Sociale. Recherches sur le capitalisme contemporain.
17 This term was used by Henri Germain, president of the Administration Board of Crédit Lyonnais.
According to Germain, operations involving foreign Governments and French investments in foreign loans
were the principal activities of this column. An “operation extraordinaire” was the one which was highly
profitable but also highly risky. This required a bank to realize serious and systematic studies on business and
on competition from other banks. See Bouvier, op. cit.
18 These commissions could involve several kinds: placement, guichet, brokerage, etc..
19 Tchernoff defines a financial syndicate as a “means to concentrate capitals, particularly floating capitals, to
canalize them to an economic, industrial or financial object”. Tchernoff, Les syndicats financiers: syndicats
d’émission et de placement, syndicats de blocage, syndicats de résistance, syndicats de bourse, investment
trust et holding : suivi de formules d’application.
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syndicates bought part or the whole amount of bonds and placed them themselves later on
(Lotz, pp.5). This system was specially used in France and Germany, although it became
common practice in other European countries.
In Paris, syndicates were classified into two groups. A “firm offer” syndicate could
subscribe a certain amount of bonds, or buy directly from the Government, taking itself a
part or the complete risk of a bond issue’s failure. A “guarantee syndicate” was represented
by a manager who, in return for a commission, “committed to find underwriters, otherwise
he would take firm the remaining of the issue”20. This guarantee system was analogous to
the “underwriting system” in London. In order to assure the success of the bond issue and
diminish the risk of the business, the issuers dealt with persons or institutions to engage in
taking a certain amount of the bonds in the case the public would not have taken the whole
issue.
By the 1880s, the formation of syndicates in London was a practice developed several
decades before (Finnie, 1934). It had an essential function, which was to provide a service
of risk insurance against market uncertainty. As Suzuki wrote, “the primary role of a
syndicate was to ensure a firm placement of the loan on the market”21. Risk-sharing
between the members of syndicates should make the business more attractive: the risk from
high-amount loans decreased, as well as the risk of issue (due to the borrower). On the
20 Tchernoff, Les syndicats financiers, p. 34.
21 Suzuki, op.cit. pp.26.
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other hand, syndicates were also a mean to guarantee the Governments the placement of a
part or the whole issue22.
3) Planning of the issue. This stage depended completely on the issue system chosen. In the
case of syndicates, several points had to be specified from the very beginning: the quantity
of bonds to be guaranteed, the nominal rate and issue price, and every loan feature so that
banks could decide to adhere to the syndicate or not. Banks had also to agree on other
aspects: the starting date of the syndicate, its duration, expenses and expected benefits.
Benefits depended on different commissions mentioned above, and in the case of the
guarantee syndicates, also on the manager’s remuneration. This kind of syndicate also
demanded a commission for each bond guaranteed, as well as a placement commission for
the unsold bonds to be distributed between the members of the syndicate and a counter
commission. Managers of these syndicates reserved also a part of net benefits for the
payment of their commission. On the other hand, underwriting syndicates obtained as an
important benefit the difference between the price of issue and the price at which the
Government sold the bonds (purchase price). Issue expenses could be taken in charge by
either the Government or the syndicate, depending on the contract signed. Syndicate
participants could be responsible for both the total results of the syndicate operations and
the part assigned to them23.
22 Syndicate participants and underwriters did not need to be the same, although syndicates may be formed to
underwrite a loan.
23 Tchernoff writes that this depended on the syndicate system chosen. In theory, two different systems
existed. The first was called “Lyonnais”(from Lyon, where this system was common). On the non-placed
remainder of a bond issue, each participant was to receive a proportional part according to its number of
placed bonds (in other words, each bank was only responsible for the difference between its syndical part and
the number of bonds that it was able to place). The second system was called “de la repartition a la
parisienne”. If all or a part of a bond issue taken firm was not placed, they were to be distributed
proportionally between the participants. In practice, however, a considerable number of hybrid systems
existed. A syndicate manager could, for instance, modify to his preference placement commissions, cession to
other intermediaries or bond placement prices. Tchernoff, pp.75
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In the underwriting system, issuers contacted investors or institutions ready to commit to
subscribe the issue in the case the public did not take the entire or part of the issue.
Underwriters were usually business partners of the issuers, or had relationships with one of
their brokers (those charged to place the bonds; brokers could also play the role of an
underwriter): merchants, manufacturers, or other financial institutions. Merchant bankers
active in bond issue matters generally engaged a part of their assets in underwriting
operations in both own issued bonds and other bonds considered attractive to them.
4) Market placement: In Paris there existed three ways to place a bond issue. The first was
through public offering, which consisted of an announcement that public subscriptions to
an issue were to take place in certain banks or financial institutions which were designed in
the prospectus or other publicity modalities24. Second, through introduction to the stock
market. This implied that issuers needed to decide the introduction price. Tchernoff
explains that the limits of variation were quite narrow. For instance, if similar bonds were
quoted already in the market, the new issue could not exceed the price. Furthermore, bond
issues depended strongly on temporary movements. Some authors sustain that issuers made
use of “fictious” operations to inflate bond prices. This practice was supposed to be widely
used in London, where introduction in the stock market was the most common manner to
place bonds. Members of syndicates, underwriters and brokers purchased bonds even
before the publication of the prospectus. Jenks wrote that “Ability to make the market
rather than financial prestige was the crucial qualification for a successful dealer in
24 This practice was also used in London and other European financial markets.
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Government loans” (pp.278). Curiously, following Cairncross one of the most remarkable
exceptions of financial intermediaries not following this practice was precisely Baring25.
Third, through the banks. Issuers could make use of bank branches against a commission
(called “placement” or “counter” commission). If these banks were themselves issuers, it
was on their own interest to directly recommend the bonds to clients in their
establishments. A main characteristic of this system is that no other publicity took place
with the exception of the direct recommendations26.
The whole process described above is shown in Figure 1. The schema shows the four stages
involved until the bonds arrived to final investors. In the simplest model, the financial
intermediary is the only agent between the Government and final investor. However, other
kind of more complicated structures could emerge, as we will later see. For instance,
intermediaries could constitute syndicates at any stage depending on the issue, market
situation or place of issue. They could also engage other underwriters or make any kind of
agreement in order to assure the best results for their issues.
As already mentioned, debt contracts are important because they summarize the
information of the process described above. They were signed by the interested parts
(Governments and issue banks) from the very beginning, and they determine all the
conditions of the bond issues. Quantitative data can be extracted from that document,
25 Cairncross, p.(93). However, a turning point conducing to Barings’ failure was the underwriting of the
Drainage and Waterworks of Buenos Aires, as markets rejected the Public offering. See Ferns (1963)
26 This fact would explain why today researchers are not able to find prospectus on certain loans of the period.
For instance, the non-existence of the documents seems to be an impediment to the widening to the Mosley’s
(2002) contracts database.
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including indebtedness costs, risk-sharing, participants’ names and numbers, etc. We will
now turn to the theoretical section of our analysis.
THE MODEL
In this section we develop a simple model of underwriting. We assume two kinds of agents,
borrowers (Governments) and lenders (banks), which have conflicting interests. The model
predicts that under competition between financial intermediaries the cost of underwriting
decreases.
We assume that a Government follows an optimal consumption path, and indebtedness
plays a relevant tool for consumption smoothing. At any time, the parliament votes a fixed
amount to be borrowed, L, including interest and issue costs. Bond issues are normalized to
1, so that:
)1( iL  (1)
where i is the yearly interest rate to be paid by the government.
The outcome of each bond issue is a priori unknown. We define αas a random variable
normally distributed measuring any market’s liquidity shock, indexed in a closed interval
(figure 2). This variable is exogenous and is known by both agents.:
~ 1],;[  U
Consider now the case of the banks. A bank willing to undertake an Initial Public Offering
(IPO) through the underwriting system faces a liquidity risk if it does not succeed in
placing the bonds. We define φas the liquidity cost for keeping an unsold bond (0 <φ<1).
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This would imply, for instance, that from an underwriting bank’s point of view the yield of
an issue, at each period, is:
i1
Measuring the total cost for a bank underwriting an issue implies taking into account two
possible outcomes:
1) Outcome 1: The market absorbs the whole amount of the issue at the expected price (or
higher). In this case the bank assumes no costs (Costs equal to zero)
2) Outcome 2: The market faces a negative liquidity shock and it does not absorb the whole
amount or the price is lower than expected.
Total costs can thus be written as the sum of all possible results multiplied by their
respective probabilities. In other words:
Total underwriting cost = Probability of State 1 multiplied by zero + Probability of
State 2 multiplied by the cost of non placement.
Following the distribution of α, we can measure total costs (anticipated loss) for the
underwriting Bank:



0
2
1

 dC (2)
and solving forα, this would result in

4
1C (3)
Let us now translate this costs to the underwriting fee, f. From the precedent section it
should be clear that Governments expect to “leave the least on the table”. We define p as
the purchase price that banks pay to the Governments for the bonds, and it defines the
proportion of the loan that is received by the Government. In other terms:
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1;1  pfp (4)
In order to compare f in two cases, monopoly and competition, we will assume from
standard microeconomic theory that, in a pure competitive case, profits equal to cero,
meaning that:

4
1compf (5)
A bank’s market power implies the existence of a potential positive profit from
underwriting an IPO. A monopolist maximizes its profits by charging an underwriting fee
that would make a Government indifferent whether contracting underwriting or facing the
risk itself (sale on commission system). Using a CRRA utility function for the government,
defined as:





1
)(
1CCU (6)
We proceed to the equalization of its expected utility with the commission system with its
utility with underwriting:
)1()( fUUE  (7)
The left-hand term can be calculated as:
 




 0
1
0
1
1
)1(
2
1
1
1
2
1)(

  





ddUE (8)
Equation (8) divides the result of an IPO depending on the sign of the liquidity shock α. A
positive shock will have no additional effect on the Government expected income (the
market absorbs the whole issue at a fixed price) but a negative shock will affect expected
income byα. By solving the integrals of (8) we get:
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This means that from equation (7) we can calculate f, and obtain:
)1/(1
2
)
)2(2
)1(1
2
1(1 


 

monf (10)
In order to compare this value with the value of f under competition, it can be shown that
compmon ff  (11)
This is shown in Appendix 1.
Let us now turn to the decision on the proportion of the loan that is to be underwritten. The
link between liquidity shocks and underwriting amounts is represented in figure 3. We will
define μas the proportion of the loan that a bank underwrites. For positive liquidity shocks
(represented by the value of αon the X-axis) underwriting is not necessary and banks face
no costs. Negative values of αrequire that the banks buy a certain amount of the bonds. If
the negative liquidity shock is higher than the fixed underwriting proportion agreed in the
contract, the Government will be obliged to face the loss itself.
As shown in equation (2), the anticipated loss for the banks taking into accountμwill be:
)(
2
1
0*
2
1 0 


ddC    (12)
Solving the equation, we get:
24
3 2 

 C (13)
In a typical case of pure competition, defining:
Cf  (14):
replacing the respective values, would result in:
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3 

compf (15)
In order to measure the guaranteed proportion of an issue offered by a monopoly, as for the
case of f, we compare the expected utility of the government when there is no underwriting
with the case where we have underwriting. The expected utility function of the government
can be rewritten as:
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Replicating equation (7), we use the value of the expected utility in (16) and compare it
with the expected utility when there is no underwriting, which allows us to get:
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It can also be shown that for any value ofμ, fcomp will always be lower than fmon27. In fact,
when the government is less risk averse (the value of γapproaches to cero) fmon approaches
fcomp.
We have calibrated our model with different parameters. Figures 4 to 7 show the results.
Figure 4 represents the relationships (iso-utility curves) between the purchase price (pa) and
μfrom a Government’s perspective. Both, higher purchase prices and higher μare
preferred, as they correspond to higher utility levels. The same relationship is shown in
Figure 5 from a bank’s perspective in the monopolist case. As we explained above, these
are the highest fees (lowest purchase prices) that a bank can charge given the Government’s
preferences. The model predicts the intuitive result of conflicting interests between banks
27 This follows directly from demonstration in Appendix 1.
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and Government. Figure 6 compares purchase prices andμfor both, competition and
monopoly. It demonstrates that competition favors Government’s terms for underwriting.
Figure 7 resumes the model in one single graphic, simulating a kind of Edgeworth box in
order to emphasize this last result. The Government has its graphic origin in the southwest
corner. Banks, have their graphic origin in the northeast corner. Goods 1 and 2 areμ
(underwriting proportion) and pa (purchase price). Thus, from a Government’s point of
view, on the abscise axis we have μ. For instance, if the whole amount of a loan is taken
firm by the banks, we will situate the point on the right extreme of the X axis. Risk is
completely taken by the banks. On the other hand, on the origin (left extreme) the risk is
taken by the government: this may be the case, for instance, for the sale on commission
system.
Good 2, represented on the ordinate axis, is the purchase price which corresponds to the net
proportion of the nominal value of the loan received by the government28. From the banks’
point of view, goods 1 and 2 are exactly the same, only going on the opposite direction.
Their X-axis is the proportion of the loan not underwritten. In other words, the less they
will take firm, the better their situation. Finally, good 2 is interpreted as the price to pay for
the bonds. The banks, acting as “purchasers”, will be interested in pay less for the bonds.
Therefore, they will press on the opposite direction than the government.
ARGENTINEAN CONTRACTS BEFORE THE BARING CRISIS
28 Empirically, in order to account for market movements, the pertinent variable to be represented as good 2 is
the net purchase price as the percentage of the UK consols price, the benchmark or risk-less asset. We will
modify this price in order to make in comparable to Latin American bonds’ prices. We have adjusted the price
assuming it presents the same coupon as the other bonds. For instance, if we were to compare it with a 5%
Argentinean bond, we transform the UK price, supposing that it also offers a 5% coupon.
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Our sources are almost every Argentinean, Brazilian and Chilean debt contracts for the
period 1880-1890. Many of them can be found in the archives of the banks. For Argentina,
an important amount of contracts for the period 1880 - 1913 are available in the Baring and
Paribas archives. Other sources include Agote (different volumes) and Peña (1906), which
contain information on contract and public finances of Argentina. With regards to Brazil,
the Rothschild archives contain all the contracts of the period, although a good amount of
information in those contracts can be found in other sources like the Brazilian Yearbook
(different volumes) and in the Ministry of Finances reports 29. Concerning Chile, the
Rothschild archives contain some contracts, and we could find additional information in the
Credit Lyonnais archives.
In this section we will concentrate on Argentina’s contracts. The history of Argentina’s
external debt was, as for most Latin American countries, very eventful throughout the 19 th
century. For the purposes of our study, we will analyze the decade prior to the crisis,
dividing it in three sub-periods (as done, for instance, by Peters (1934)). In the first sub-
period, from 1880 to 1884, Argentina signed four contracts with European bankers. One
important characteristic during these years was the dominance of French banks in the
Argentinean national business, replacing British banks’ dominating position and limiting it
to bond placing activities. French banks affronted successfully British competition by
constituting underwriting syndicates (later imitated by German banks), whereas British
29 These reports are available online. I thank Andre Villela for this and other useful information. The web
address is: http://brazil.crl.edu/bsd/bsd/hartness/fazend.html.
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banks acted alone and realized merely financial intermediation activities (with no risk-
taking)30.
The second sub-period concentrates on the year 1885, a brief crisis period in Argentina
(leaving a temporary gold standard regime). During this year, a contract was signed
between Argentina’s Government and European banks involved in Argentinean business,
canceling two previous loans which had completely failed and converting the debt into a
major long term loan and conceding a new short-term advance to alleviate a critical fiscal
situation.
The third sub-period (1886-1889) begins with the issues of the long term loan (made in two
parts, in January1886 and 1887). It experiences an important “boom” in Argentinean
national (five loans including three conversions), provincial and municipal bonds, and the
entry of a new competitor: German banks.
First Sub-Period, the breakdown of British monopoly
Table 1 shows the loans that took place during these years. The first two loans were
contracted with the Paribas syndicate31. It dominated the market for the issues of
Argentina’s National Government bonds during the first half of the 1880s. Regarding the
first loan (called the “Railway Loan”), fierce competition between intermediaries marked
its previous negotiation. For the first time since the independence of the country,
Argentina’s national Government received several offers from British and French banks
even before promulgation of the law by the Argentinean parliament allowing the external
30 For a detailed description on French banks entering Argentinean business see Regalsky (1984).
31 Members of that sindícate were: Paribas, Cahen d’Anvers and Comptoir d’Escompte.
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loan32. An interesting feature of the loan is that the Government showed a strong preference
for “firm offers”, thereby letting a good amount on the table, as the issue price was 91,
when the purchase price for the bonds that the Government received was only33 82.
The second loan contracted by Paribas was the “Treasury loan” of a much smaller amount.
It was also negotiated with a firm basis but the public offering resulted in an unexpected
reduced underwriting fee for the Banks. Unfavorable conditions in European markets
(Regalsky) and the high frequency of new bond issues (Jones) seem to be the principal
factors lying behind these deceiving results.
Matters were more complicated later on. For the third loan (“National Bank Loan”), the
same syndicate refused to take the whole loan on a firm basis at the first stage and, instead,
opted to make a short-term advance to the Government and to have the possibility to buy
firm in a one year period the totality of the loan or the nominal capital equivalent to the sum
to be paid by the Argentinean Government.
For each of the Public Offerings, Baring acted as the sole issuer in London. That is, the
French syndicate negotiated with Argentina’s Government the loans, and then agreed with
Baring (and signed another contract) the conditions under which Baring would place the
bonds in the London market.34
32 According to Regalsky, there existed four candidates ready to negotiate the loan issue: two English banks
and two French syndicates (represented by Paribas and Société Générale, respectively). On the other hand,
Jones writes that two other banks were also interested in the affaire: the Spanish bank Vega, Ibañez & Co.
and Erlanger & Co. from London.
33 The resulting underwriting fee, which was extraordinarily high, was unknown at the moment of the
contract. Following Jones (1972), Argentina’s Government expected a negative shock which could cause
prejudice to the credit of the country.
34 A 1% placement commission on the nominal amount of the loan was stipulated for Baring, and the
syndicate was in charge of all expenses for the issue. At the same time, commissions paid by the Argentinean
government were to be shared between Baring and the Syndicate: 1% on coupon payments and ½% on
redemption.
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This sub-period ended with two loans negotiated almost at the same time with two different
syndicates and which failed to be placed in the markets. The “Public Works” loan was
signed with a new Anglo-French syndicate. The main cause behind the switch of bankers
was the refusal of the Paribas syndicate to issue any new loan before the market had
absorbed the whole amount of bonds from former issues that remained still in their hands.
The new loan was also negotiated on a firm basis (although only one third of the issue).
However, when the issue was on the eve of taking place on September 1884, rumors
concerning convertibility suspension in Argentina were rife, and the syndicate was left with
most bonds in their hands.35
Finally, the Paribas syndicate accepted to negotiate a new loan (called “Salubridad y
Riachuelo”) on similar terms than the previous Public Works loan, although market
conditions had meanwhile made the placement of the bonds impossible.
Figure 8 resumes the conditions of issue for the loans of this sub-period. It compares both,
purchase and issue prices with secondary market prices for similar bonds (5% and 6%).
Interestingly, the first two loans were considerably underpriced, for both, purchase and
issue prices, but this feature disappears for the next loans, suggesting a market making
strategy in the earlier years36. Again, the fact that underpricing disappears in the next years
may be due to competition between banks’ syndicates, implicitly assuming more risk
offering higher purchase prices and leaving less scope to define an attractive issue price.
Second Sub-Period, the Pellegrini agreement
35 H.E. Peters, op. cit., pp. 39.
36 On underpricing, see Ljungvquist (2004).
25
At this stage, the Argentinean Government found itself needing fresh funds to meet their
short-term obligations. Particularly after the 1884 failures, a Government agent, Dr. Carlos
Pellegrini, was sent to Europe to unblock the situation. The problem that he had to face was
well summarized in a report to Argentina’s Government:
“Once he arrived, he found himself in an embarrassing situation; the French syndicate
who took firm $4,000,000 of the 12,000,000 Riachuelo loan, could not place the bonds on
the market. Morgan, who took $10,000,000 firm of the Public Works loan ($30,000,000)
could not place but £300,000. Between these syndicates rivalry impeded any action. In
these circumstances, the agent began negotiations to unify both syndicates and incorporate
the Baring banking house”37
A first agreement between the Government and a “unified syndicate” of all banks
participating in the 1884 loans was signed on the 6th and 7th of July, 188538. The
“Salubridad y Riachuelo” loan, taken by the Paribas syndicate, was completely cancelled
(£2.4 million), whereas the “Public works” loan, taken by the Syndicate represented by
Société Générale was cancelled (£4 million nominal worth bonds out of £6 million) only
partially. On the other hand, the Government agreed to repurchase part of the loans taken
firm by the banks. The arrangement “consolidated” both loans in one big issue amounting
£8.4 million, which became the most important loan ever accorded to a Latin-American
country.
37 Own translation from Spanish. Report of the Argentinean parliament, published in La Prensa, 21 October
1885.
38 The banks participating in the agreement were: Paribas, Comptoir d’Escompte, Cahen d’Anvers, Société
Générale, Crédit Industriel, Baring and the North American house of Morgan.
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Obviously, no firm offer was made, and the bonds were to be placed in the market by the
sale on commission system39. The contract presented two special features. First, the famous
guarantee that Argentina’s Government was obliged to cede to the bankers: the customs
revenues40. The National Bank of Argentina, responsible for the collection of the
Government’s revenues, was charged for opening a special account to deposit the necessary
funds to meet debt service. Second, Argentina’s Government committed not to “authorize
or sanction, as long as this Government is in charge, the issue of any loan, without a
formal previous agreement from the other contracting party”.41 The contract referred
particularly to a loan already voted by the parliament to raise the capital for the Bank of the
Province of Buenos Ayres, the most important bank of the country.
However, matters did not happen as foreseen. The Argentinean parliament, to whose
approval the agreement was conditioned, refused it on the 11th of August, giving as a main
reason the inclusion of the guarantee clause, which was considered as “depressive to the
dignity of the country”42. We can only speculate about the real reasons of this refusal, and
time gaining may be a plausible one. Within the next months, a new law was voted to take
an external loan of £4 million. The “Bank of the Province of Buenos Ayres” loan was taken
in charge by the provincial Government, and finally, on the 21st of October, 1885, the
parliament voted a new agreement with the banks. Except a few insignificant modifications,
the resulting new contract (called “the 1885 Agreement”) was practically the same.
39 The Government paid 2.5% on the nominal amount of the bonds sold. Charges of the issue, brokerage,
stamp, publicity and legal fees were all paid by the Government as well.
40 Government revenues from the customs duties constituted in 1884 about 62%. Banks seem to have been
aware of this fact. See Ferns, H.S. Britain and Argentina in the nineteenth century. Oxford : Clanrendon Press,
1960 for a detailed discussion on the effects of the agreement. Also : Flores, Juan. The Pellegrini Agreement :
A Historical Case of Moral Hazard ? Unpublished Manuscript, 2002.
41Own translation from French. Contract of July 1885, Paribas archives.
42 La Prensa, op.cit.
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Third Sub-period: 1886-1889, the loan boom
Despite the prohibitive clause not allowing the Argentinean Government to take new loans,
in 1886 it continued to seek external funds. In October a contract was signed with Murrieta,
for the extension of the “North Station Railway”. This bank had not participated in the 1885
agreement. In fact, no bank participating in that syndicate was allowed to contract new
loans. However, the favorable results of the 1886 issue (the first part of the £8,4 millions
loan) eased the market for new bonds. For instance, Baring could finally place a bond issue
for the province of Buenos Ayres contracted several years before. But the turning point was
the new competitors stalking the Argentinean market: the German banks.
On 25th of January, 1887, a French-German syndicate43 signed a contract to advance the
Argentinean National Bank the equivalent of £1,5 millions. As a guarantee, the syndicate
would receive bonds equivalent to £2 million in internal debt (which were to be converted
to external debt by a law to be passed by the Argentinean parliament). Some months later,
an additional syndicate represented by Deutsche Bank44 also signed a contract on a firm
basis with Argentina’s Government on the 14th of July, 1887, and aimed to convert the 5%
loans contracted at the beginning of the decade. Once again, lacking an English partner in
the syndicate, Baring acted as the issuer in London, obtaining a favorable outcome.
43 The syndicate was formed by Disconto Gesellshcaft, Norddeutsche Bank, Oppenheim and Banque
d’Anvers
44 The other participants were: Mendehlsohn, Bank für Hander, Bethmann, Deutsche Vereinsbank, Disconto
Gesellshcaft, Norddeutsche Bank, Bleichshcröder, Oppenheim, Cahen d’Anvers, Heine, Société Génerale
pour favoriser le développement du commerce et de l’Industrie en France, Société Généra le du Crédit
Industriel et Commerciale.
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At the end of the decade, Argentina’s National Government contracted two additional
loans. A first contract was signed with a syndicate formed by German, French, and English
banks. The second loan was contracted with the banking house of Stern. According to the
first contract, the objective of the loan was the conversion of 6% bonds issued in the 1870s
and the beginning of the 1880s. The syndicate, composed of eight banks, took firm the total
amount of the loan. Finally, the second contract was taken by the sale on commission
system. The loan to be converted was the much problematic “Hard Dollar Loan”45, to a 3
½% coupon and 1% redemption.
From a total of eleven contracts46, eight were taken firm (totally or partially) either at the
moment of the signature of the contract (6) or as an option (2). For the two contracts for
which the loans were taken firm as a posteriori option, a short-term advance was included
in the contract (both National Bank loans). The lowest net purchase price was the 1884
Public Works loan, and the highest was the Treasury 1882. Short-term advances implied
interest rates of 7% (interest rate + commission), except the National Bank 1886 loan,
which rate was 8% . Sale commissions for the loans not taken firm amounted to 2.5% on
nominal capital, not taking into account the Hard Dollars conversion Loan, whose
commission amounted only 1.25%. Complete contract features are resumed in Table 1.
45 This was an originally internal loan issued in 1876 with a nominal amount of 6 million gold pesos, bearing
9% annual interests and 4% redemption. Although at the time of the issue the price remained low (75), by
1881 the quotation was 122. The Government refused to redeem the bonds by purchase in the market and
“insisted upon its right to call at par, which was disputed by British holders”. For a detailed discussion on
Argentina’s conflicts with foreign bondholders see Peters (1934).
46 There exists an additional contract, signed with Murrieta for a nominal amount of £0,6 millions, with a 5%
coupon issued in June 1887. We have not found enough information to include this loan in our analysis.
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In order to conclude this section, we can say that conditions concerning Argentina’s
external loans for 1880-1889 were quite volatiles. It seems that they were very favorable at
the beginning of the decade, considerably deteriorating between 1884 and 1886, and
improving the last years. In the next section we aim to show if these movements were
coherent with economic fundamentals or which other factors determined Argentina’s
contract terms.
CONTRASTING THE MODEL WITH THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Having our theoretical model in mind, we can turn back to empirical evidence. Following
the information presented in the last section, we can construct our negotiating diagram
(from figure 7) for Argentina and its banks. It is shown in Figure 947 and Figure 10,
constructed with the data from Table 1. Figure 9 shows the general path of Argentina’s
loans for the years 1880-1889, and Figure 10 focus on the five years previous to the crisis48.
It shows that from the 1885 Agreement, there has been a considerable improvement in the
terms of the later contracts from Argentina’s Government perspective. For the 1886
National Bank Loan, banks underwrote half of the loan, with a better purchase price than
the “minimum price” of the 1885 Agreement (in other words, fees were lower). By the end
of the period, underwriting was complete for all the loans with higher purchase prices,
resulting in maximum utility levels for the Government.
47 We left aside two loans, because they lacked of a minimum price.
48 Loans for which we had enough quantitative information and which could be modeled were included in the
figure.
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What lies behind the results of this figures? There may be two answers. A first possibility
are economic fundamentals. The Argentinean economic position was supposed to be
closely followed by capital markets. Therefore, we expect that by having solid
fundamentals, a Government would be able to access better terms on its loans, as the risk of
default decreases. The stronger the fundamentals, the better these terms. As mentioned
above, bankers expected diminished risks and higher profits of bond issues of “well-
behaved” countries, having incentives to improve their offers concerning Government’s
loans.
A second possibility is market failure. Regardless of fundamentals, banks may become
more eager to get the loans as competition becomes decisive. They will behave as we
expect from the model presented above, lowering the fees (offering higher purchase prices)
and/or underwriting higher portions of the loans. This means that banks are obliged to make
better offers concerning prices, but also to take greater risks. We will come back to this
point in the next section. In order to identify the effects of both fundamentals and
competition, we will take a closer look at their behavior during the decade.
We will begin with the Argentinean economic fundamentals. Table 2 shows some of the
main variables than influence risk perception on a given country49. Most studies about late
19th century Argentina point out the generalized vision of a vigorous young country which
attracted both labor and capital. The 1880s was particularly an expansionary period, where
real GDP per capita estimates amount for an impressive 8% average growth (Cerro, 2000,
49 Some of them are taken following those suggested in the literature on 19th century finance. See Flandreau
(2003).
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Cortés Conde, 1979, Della Paolera, 1988). The other side of the coin, however, is the
general fragility of the economy, which was to be abruptly corrected after the Baring crisis.
Increasing twin deficits, only interrupted during the two years of the 1885 crisis, marked
Argentina’s external position. Gold standard was abandoned since 1885, and an increasing
depreciation of the peso followed thereafter. Reserves the in banks of issue were also
decreasing in those years, but monetary issues were still booming.
Public finances not only on the national, but also on provincial and municipal Governments
were deteriorating. In fact, a careful analysis of the fiscal position in the National
Government such as presented by Della Paolera (2001), Regalsky (1987) or Duncan (1983)
give a good idea of the troubles faced in Argentina to meet debt service. A pioneer analysis
by Terry (1893), which was to become Finance minister during the 1890s, also shows that
the deteriorating public finances began already in 1885.
A careful analysis of the Finance Ministry Reports would show some worrying signals, as
noticed by the press and by different economic reports on Argentina. First, as already
mentioned, public deficits were booming, financed through monetary issues since 1887 and
external debt. Second, debt service as part of the public revenues was also increasing, in
partly due to the increasing depreciation of the paper peso. Third, debt denominated in
foreign currency (gold) was also higher, including the loans of 1887 and 1889, which
converted some paper denominated loans into gold loans. Finally, since 1887, debt service
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was met by extraordinary revenues, including sales of public assets and gold that entered
into the Government arches by the Free Banking law50.
COMPETITION AND THE BARING CRISIS
We have several reasons to believe that competition was a key factor behind the Baring
crisis. First, previous works on Argentina’s loans in the 1880s emphasize the competitive
behavior of European bankers to get the “business”. Second, comparing Argentina’s
situation with other Latin American countries where competition was limited (Chile) or
inexistent (Brazil) may give us a clue of importance in competition facing the negotiation
of debt contracts. Third, the terms of a contract signed between Baring and the Argentinean
Government (finally not issued) was the worst of the decade from Argentina’s perspective.
It was negotiated at a time when Baring no longer had competition. Finally, and as a
consequence of the 1890 crisis, Argentina’s history of its reentrance to international capital
markets was marked by the monopoly of Baring as the only bank in issuing the bonds. We
will proceed to review each argument in detail.
Figure (11) shows an Index of competition between financial intermediaries. It measures
the part of the market for the two and three dominant banks on the market (Murrieta and
Baring). It is constructed on the cumulative value of the bonds on the market in each year.
This index decreases in time, showing a clear downturn path during the decade previous to
the crisis.
50 By this law, provinces were supposed to deposit gold in Exchange for National Government bonds in order
to constitute the reserves of the new created provincial banks. On this Free banking law see Della Paolera
(2001).
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Argentina’s historiography supports the fact that competition between bankers played in
favor of Argentina in the form of decreasing borrowing costs. Jones (1984) offers a detailed
analysis on competition for the first Argentinean loan in the 1880s (the “French loan”). The
law approved by the Argentinean congress on a £2,4 million loan initiated a race between
the offers by European banks to get the loan51. After a few months receiving several offers
(see Table 3), the Argentinean government accepted the offer of the French syndicate
represented by Paribas, which contemplated a firm offer with a net price of 82.
A second argument implies a comparison of Argentina’s situation with other countries.
Thus, in order to have this comparative benchmark, we will situate the Argentinean
situation in a broader context, studying two additional Latin American countries. We will
begin with Brazil, which signed four contracts with a monopoly, Rothschild. Relationship
between that country’s Government and Rothschild differed from Argentina’s own
relationship with any other bank. For instance, Rothschild was literally Brazil’s only bank,
in the sense that the government had its own account in Rothschild’s balance sheet easing
the monitoring through this account. It was called “Brazil agency”:
“This account shows the amount standing to the credit of the Brazilian government, and the
amounts debited for dividends and for sinking funds charges. The account is balanced at
the end of each month and a copy is sent to the government. It contains also a record of the
installments received on account of each loan…”52
51 Those banks included Barings, Stern, Vega Ibañez & Co, a French syndicate (BNPB, Comptoir
de’Escompte and Cahen d’Anvers), Heine, Heimendahl, Murrieta, a second French syndicate and Erlanger.
52 The Rothschild archives. Transactions of a Committee to enquire into the organization of the Accounts. 18
November 1908.
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General conditions on the rest of Brazilian contracts are shown in Table 4. Unlike
Argentina, Brazil was obliged to face all the risk of the issue (sale on commission system).
On the other hand, Brazil benefited from better contract terms than Argentina. The
minimum price (guaranteed) was generally higher, and commissions were lower. However,
these differences between both countries tended to diminish, and, by the end of the period,
they were at their minimum.
This dynamic comparison contrasts with Cairncross’ (1953) argument about competition in
European capital markets. Based on Peter’s work (1934), Cairncross argued that Argentina,
lacking a fix agent in London, negotiated its loans in worse terms than countries that had
one. He mentions the case of Brazil to show his point, arguing that this country could get
terms almost as good terms as Holland . We do not agree with this conclusion. First, as we
have seen, Argentina was able to share the risks of its bonds’ issues with the banks. Second,
Cairncross looks only at the period 1880-1885, which sharply contrasts with the second
half of the decade. And third, the macroeconomics and debt history of both countries
contrasted sharply, as Argentina had defaulted several times on its external debt service
while Brazil kept a perfect record, and this was reflected in the yields of their bonds.
A second interesting case was Chile, a country with which Argentina had a strong rivalry.
Chile was indeed the country with the best terms concerning the countries we compare.
Differences between both countries were more than marginal. Chile signed four contracts
with European and American banking houses, in 1885, 1886, 1887 and 1889. The first
contract was signed with City Bank but we could not get enough information to describe it.
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Both 1886 and 1887 contracts were signed with Rothschild’s, and in 1889 it was a
syndicate represented by Deutsche Bank who floated the loan.
Looking at the Chilean economic fundamentals, this country had a stable but flexible
exchange rate regime, and, more important, it was the less indebted country of the three.
Table 5 shows its contracts terms and economic fundamentals. An striking feature is that,
for 1886 and 1887, Rothschild took firm the whole amount of the loans, and for a relatively
high price. In fact, Brazil and Chile can be directly comparable, as they negotiated with the
same bank. For instance, for the 1887 Chilean loan, Rothschild underwrote the issue at a
purchase price of 96, which meant very good contract terms as compared to any other Latin
American country.
The most advantageous contract for Chile took place in 1889 and was signed with a
German syndicate. It remained in similar terms than the contracts with Rothschild’s, with
yet another feature favorable to Chile, due to competition between banks. The syndicate
paid the first coupon of the loan (lowering thus the final fee paid by Chile) . As far as we
know, no other Latin American country could get such a clause in its contracts, and this
reflected the higher status of the Chilean credit in international financial markets. However,
as it was for Brazil, differences between Argentina and Chile tended to diminish as we
approached the end of the 1880s decade, and Argentinean latest loans’ terms were only
slightly below those for Chile. As we have seen, one possibility to explain this would be
that the Argentinean economic fundamentals improved, whereas Chilean remained stable or
worsened. But as we have seen, Argentinean fundamentals did not improve, and the
Chilean did not change.
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To conclude our comparison, we drew the same diagram as we did for Argentina for the
loans floated on behalf of both, Brazil and Chile (Figure …). As mention above, even if
Argentina may have begun the decade with worse terms, it rapidly caught these differences
by the end of the period. Clearly, economic fundamentals cannot explain this
“convergence”.
The Baring contract of 1890 is another proof of the fact that macroeconomics and the fiscal
position of the government were delegated to a second plan. Although, as we have seen, the
trajectory of Argentina’s contract terms improved in the second half of the 1880, the crucial
year of 1890 offers a completely different story. From the correspondence of Baring with
other Bankers53 we know that Baring tried to form a syndicate for a loan issue of £10
millions in order to improve the fiscal situation of Argentina’s national government and to
support the depreciating peso. Baring did succeed to convince Morton and Murrieta in a
rather minimal way, but in risk terms it remained alone. Figure 13 represents the terms of
the contract comparing with the previous loans. Clearly, with a desperate macroeconomic
situation and without competition, the terms of this contract considerably worsened. The
strong conditionality imposed at this stage may have played a role in Argentina’s eventual
decision to default.
Finally, looking beyond the period, the crisis marked a difficult period for both Argentina
and Baring. On the one side, Baring needed a bailout orchestrated by the Bank of England,
53 Box Hc4 1.113 of the Baring Archives.
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and was separated in two branches54. On the other side, Argentina needed two successive
funding loans, and did not have access to the international capital markets during almost 10
years. In fact, the loans contracted between 1900 and1913 were all negotiated and issued by
Baring, simulating its quasi-monopolist situation of the pre-1880 period.
CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a different story not taken into account by the traditional theories
explaining the Baring crisis adding a new and decisive element. As suggested in this paper,
financial intermediation and competition issues may have played a key role in pushing
Argentina in the financial situation of 1890 by overborrowing at decreasing costs. The
1880s is precisely an interesting decade because monopoly in Argentina’s debt issues was
replaced by a competitive market structure. Although Baring was aware at any moment of
the government’s fiscal position, it had little or no incentive to properly monitor and
releasing information to the market because, say, the bank risked its market position and
preferred rather to follow the masses (nourishing the mania for Argentinean bonds).
Although other information sources already raised suspicions about deteriorating financial
situation in Argentina, the market was reassured by Baring’s involvements in Argentina’s
bond issues, as claimed by Kindleberger. Matters became too evident between march and
July of 1890, where partial default and political riots in Buenos Aires definitely made the
market hostile to any new loans to Argentina, at the time were Baring planned new issues
to ease the situation in that country. Neither the market was willing to channel new funds to
the country, nor the short-term rent seeking banks. This paper thus supports the importance
of financial long-term relationships.
54 However, the bank was soon on its own feet and reentered the business of foreign borrowing.
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APPENDIX 1
Following the results from the theoretical model, it can be shown that:
compmon ff  (10)
Recall the second term of the right side of equation (9) (we will name it A). If is true that
the fee under monopoly is higher than under competition, we would have that:

4
11 A
reordering terms, this would result in:
1
4
1  A
as A by definition is lower than 1, inequality (10) is true. Note also that, in a competitive
market, the risk aversion of the agent (Government) does not matter (meter articulos). This
is a result compatible with standard literature. On the other hand, the value of f in monopoly
increases with risk aversion.
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Figure 6: Competition vs Monopoly Figure 7: The theoretical Model
Figure 8: IPOs of Argentina’s Sovereign issues Figure 9: Argentina´s sovereign loans
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Figure 10: Argentina’s 1885-1889 loans Figure 11: Competition Indexes for Argentina’s bond issues
Figure 12: Brazil’s and Chile’s loans Figure 13: Baring’s 1890 contract.
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Loans
Nominal
Amount
(millions
£)
Net
purchase
price
Normalized 3%
Consols price at
contract date Pa/PUK
Proportion of
the loan
taken firm
Issue
Price
Resulting
fee
Short-
term
advance
(d)
Advance’s
Commission
and Interest rate
Commission
on sold bonds
Redemption’s
commission
Minimum
price
Coupon’s
payment
commission
Expenses
(%)
Railways
1881 6% 2,45 82 199,3 0,411 1
91 9
0 0 0 0,5 No 1 CB
Treasury 6% 0,81 90,5 199,3 0,454 1 92,5 2 0 0 0 0,5 No 1 CB
National
Bank 1884
5%
1,7 79,35 170 0,466 0,56 (a)
84,5 5,1
0,56 0,25 (b), 6% 0 0,5 No 1 CG
Health and
Riachuelo 5%
5,9 78,6 166,1 0,471 0,33 Not
issued
NA 0 0 2,5 0,5 Yes 1 CG
Public Works
5%
2,4 78,3 170,6 0,460 0,33 84 5,7 0 0 0 0,5 Yes 1 CG
1885
Agreement
5%
8,4 0 166,6 0,450 0
NA NA
0,48 0,5 (c), 6% 2,5 0,5 Yes, 75 1 0,75
National
Bank 1886
5%
2 85 167,8 0,476 0,75 (a)
90 5
0,75 0,5 (b), 6% 0 0,5 No 0,5 5
Railways
1886 5% 3,9 80 167,8 0,506 0
84,5 4,5
0 0 2,5 * 0,5 No 0,5* CG
Conversion
Harddollars
3,5%
2,75 0 NA 0
NA NA
0 0 1,25 0,5 No 0,5 0,5 + CG
Refinance
4,5% 1887 5,26 82,5 152,5 0,540 1
87 4,5
0 0 0 0,5 Yes, 85 0,5 2,5
Refinance
4,5% 1889
5,29 85,5 151,5 0,564 1 90 4,5 0 0 0 0,5 Yes, 88 0,5 2,5
Table 1: Argentina’s debt contracts.
Sources : See Text. Notes : (a) : Firm part taken by the banks, or short-term advance ; (b) :each trimester ; (c) : each semester ; (d) : part fro. total amount ;
CB : issue’s expenses taken in charge by the banks. CG : issue’s expenses taken in charge by the government, amount not specified in the contract.
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Years
Real GDP
Growth (%)
Depreciation of
paper peso /
British Pound
(%)
Inflation
Deficit / Public
revenue
Debt service /
Public revenue
Percentage of
debt service
paid in Gold
1885 6.03 37 22.8 0.48 0.3 0.77
1886 -0.03 1.45 3.1 0.34 0.51 0.68
1887 11.9 -2.87 -4 0.18 0.43 0.6
1888 9.9 9.6 0 0.34 0.47 0.89
1889 17.2 21.62 19.8 0.34 0.62 0.93
1890 -4.3 43.33 40.9 0.25 1.07 NA
Table 2: Argentina´s Macroeconomic situation.
Sources: GDP growth, inflation: from Della Paolera (1988). Paper peso values from The Economist, monthly averages. Public finance variables from Memorias
de Hacienda, 1885-1890.
Date Offer made by
Purchase
price Issue system Observations
December
1880
Stern 75.5 Sale on commission Successive offers came afterwards from
other banks improving price terms
March 1881 Stern 78 Firm offer Stern improved the offer some days later
to 80,5 but retired thereafter.
March 1881 Baring 85 Firm offer
The offer was not finally made because it
was not authorized in London.
March 1881 Paribas syndicate 82 Firm offer The final contract was signed on the 24th.
Table 3. Successive offers for the “French Loan” of 1881.
Sources: See text.
Loans
Nominal
Amount
(millions
£)
Issue
Price
Net
Price
Normalized
UK 3%
Consols price
at contract
time
Pa/PUK
Banker’s
Commissio
n and
stamps
Brokerage
commission
Number of
installments
for bond
purchase
Time for
bonds’
payments
(months)
Discount
on
anticipated
bond
payments
Commissions
on interest
payments
Commission
for
redemption
by drawing/
purchase in
the market
Service
/Revenu
Exchange
rate
depreciation
1883
4,5% 4,6 89 86,75 156,5 0,55 2 0,25 5 10 4,5 1 0,5 0,125
0,4 0,3
1886
5% 6,4 95 92,75 178 0,52 2 0,25 5 6 5 1 0,5 0,125
0,5
-10,7
1888
4,5% 6,3 97 95,25 171,8 0,49 1,5 0,25 6 6 4,5 1 0,5 0,125
0,3
-11,35
1889
4% 19,8 90 88,25 149,6 0,59 1,5 0,25 5 6 4,5 1 0,5 0,125
0,3
-7,2
Table 4: Brazil’s contract terms and macroeconomic situation
Sources: See text.
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Loans
Nominal
Amount
(millions
£)
Issue
Price
Net
Price
Normalized
UK 3%
Consols price
at contract
time
Pa/PUK
Banker’s
Commissio
n and
stamps
Brokerage
commission
Number of
installments
for bond
purchase
Time for
bonds’
payments
(months)
Discount
on
anticipated
bond
payments
Commissions
on interest
payments
Commission
for
redemption
by drawing/
purchase in
the market
Service/
Revenu
Exchange
rate
depreciation
1886
4,5%
6 98 96 158,4 0,61 G 0 6 9 4 0,5 0,5 0,125 0,2 6,25
1887
4,5%
1,2 97,1 96 165,1 0,58 G 0 6 9 4 0,5 0,5 0,125 0,2 -2,29
1889
4,5%
1,5 102 97 171,4 0,56 0,5 0 NC NC NC 0,5 0,5 0,125 0,2 -1,09
Table 5: Chile’s contract terms and macroeconomic situation.
Sources: See text.
